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INTRODUCTION
Historically, the contract of employment has served, and continues to serve,
as the main ‘port of entry’ to what is today termed the individual
employment relationship.1 In general, its terms (express or implied) will
govern that relationship, except to the extent that they are unlawful or have
been superseded by statute2 or collective agreement.3 This is the essence of
what used to be known as the law of master and servant.
This article revisits these basic propositions. It sets out to examine the
underlying relationship between the contract of employment and statutory
labour law which, together, form the heart of individual labour law (or, as it
* The title may call to mind what has in Britain been termed the ‘oil and water’
approach to the relationship between common law and statute; that is, ‘the view
dominant since the time of Coke and Blackstone that common law and statutes ﬂow
next to but separately from each other in their separate streams’: Jack Beatson ‘The
role of statute in the development of common law doctrine’ (2001) 117 LQR 247 at
251, cited in Bob Hepple ‘The common law and statutory rights’ in Rights at Work:
Global, European and British perspectives (2005) at 3; available at http://ucl.ac.uk/laws/
hamlyn/hamlyn04_3.pdf (last accessed on 6 February 2008). In fact, the article
explores an alternative view that was ﬁrst put forward by the author in a paper with
the same title delivered at the 19th Annual Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg,
5–7 July 2006.
† (Available at http://www.irnetwork.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=template&fn=
default.htm&vid=irnetwork:10.1048/enu).
1 Alan Rycroft & Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1991)
para 1.1.7.1.
2 To alter the common law, a statute ‘must either expressly say that it is the
intention of the legislature to alter the common law, or the inference . . . must be such
that we can come to no other conclusion’: Casserly v Stubbs 1916 TPD 310 at 312,
cited in S v Makhatini 1995 (2) BCLR 226 (D) at 230.
3 Or, since 1994, the Constitution. For a more detailed discussion of the sources
of individual employment law, see S R van Jaarsveld & B P S van Eck Principles of
Labour Law 2 ed (2002) paras 87–91; JohnGrogan Workplace Law 9 ed (2007) chap 1.
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is more commonly known internationally, ‘employment law’). In general,
the enactment of labour legislation in South Africa (as in other countries)
signiﬁed that government was attempting to pour oil on the troubled waters
of the common-law relationship.4 The outcome, it is argued, has been one in
which contract and statute — quite unlike oil and water — have become
inextricably intermingled. The process, however, has not been systematic.
Judgments dealing with the relationship between common law and statute
have frequently shown a rather ad hoc approach. The result has been a
growing number of ambiguities and, in general, a confusing overlay between
statutory and contractual rights and remedies.
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court ofAppeal had an opportunity to
clarify the position.5 Unfortunately, it cannot be said that this was done. At
issue was the right to procedural fairness prior to dismissal, a doctrine of
recent statutory origin without any antecedents in the contract of employ-
ment. With surprisingly little deliberation the court found that such a right is
‘now protected by the common law: to the extent necessary, as developed
under the constitutional imperative (s 39(2)) to harmonize the common law
into the Bill of Rights (which itself includes the right to fair labour practices
(s 23(1))’.6 No less surprisingly, in deﬁning the content of the right, the court
based itself not on the jurisprudence developed in terms of the current
Labour RelationsAct7 but on the courts’ interpretation of fairness in terms of
the previous LRA8 and international law. This may be linked to the court’s
conclusion that the right to procedural fairness can have different sources:
either ‘the common law or a statute . . . applies to the employment
relationship between the parties [or] the parties may opt for certainty and
4 That is, not only by regulating the contractual relationship to prevent abuse but
also by promoting collective bargaining as a means of addressing the inherent inequal-
ity between employer and employee: see generally Paul Davies & Mark Freedland
Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983). Thus the Industrial ConciliationAct 11
of 1924, which laid the foundations for centralized collective bargaining in South
Africa, was a direct response to the revolt of white mineworkers against their employ-
ers’ common-law power to hire (cheaper black employees) and ﬁre (unionized white
employees); in similar vein, its radical revision ﬁfty-ﬁve years later (discussed below)
was prompted by the revolt of black workers against the conditions imposed on them
in terms of a largely unreconstructed common-law regime, aggravated by apartheid
legislation. See also the comments by Froneman J in WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty)
Ltd v Vermeulen [1997] 2 BLLR 124 (LAC) at 128–9.
5 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi (2007) 28 ILJ 1499 (SCA), in effect
overruling the approach of the High Court in Harper v Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of
New York, Johannesburg 2004 (3) SA253 (W); (2004) 25 ILJ 1024 (W) para 15–16.
6 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi supra note 5 para 5. It is, however,
respectfully submitted that the ‘constitutional imperative’ applies only ‘to the extent
that legislation does not give effect to [a provision of the Bill of Rights]’: s 8(3) of the
Constitution.
7 Act 66 of 1995 (‘the LRA’).
8 That is, Act 28 of 1956, with speciﬁc reference to Slagment (Pty) Ltd v Building,
Construction and Allied Workers’ Union 1995 (1) SA 742 (A) and National Union of
Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (4) SA577 (A).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL96
incorporate the right in the employment agreement’.9 In the case at hand, it
appears that such a right had not been incorporated into the contract of
employment; rather, the court inferred its existence from the development
which the common law is assumed to have undergone in order to give effect
to the constitutional right to fair labour practices.10
This judgment is the latest in a series (discussed below) in which the courts
have upheld common-law rights in the face of overlapping or competing
statutory rights. In the employment context, it will be argued, this is
problematic. To infer the existence of a common-law right duplicating a
statutory right is to call into question the purpose of enacting that statutory
right. Likewise, the reason for creating statutory rules where common-law
rules already exist becomes unclear, since the promulgation of the former
seemingly does not necessarily, as might have been thought, signify any
intention of the legislature to replace the latter. Indeed, even the fact that the
enactment of a statutory right (for example, an employer’s right to dismiss an
employee for a fair reason based on its operational requirements)11 is at odds
with a common-law right (such as an employee’s right to remain in
employment until the expiry of a ﬁxed-term contract) is not considered
enough to overrule the latter right ‘by necessary implication’ in circum-
stances where the employer’s operational requirements justify dismissal.12
This comes close to asserting the supremacy of common law over statute.
Against this background, the trend towards the etablishment of two
parallel regimes of employment law — one based on statute and one on
common law — has been given added momentum by the judgment in the
Gumbi case. This cannot be conducive to legal certainty. It remains to be
seen how the issue will be resolved if and when the Supreme Court of
Appeal or the Constitutional Court considers it explicitly and in all its
ramiﬁcations.
This article explores the possibility of a more consistent articulation
between the two principal regulators of the employment relationship, based
on the underlying constitutional rights.
HAS THE WHEEL TURNED FULL CIRCLE?
It is helpful to begin by viewing the issue in its historical setting. Up to the
1970s the law of master and servant held sway in the context of the individual
9 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi supra note 5 para 4 with reference
to Lamprecht v McNeillie 1994 (3) SA665 (A) at 668.
10 Even if this is so, it is not obvious why reliance should be placed on pre-
constitutional jurisprudence in interpreting the right to procedural fairness implied by
the Constitution, given the existence of a massive body of case law on this very issue
developed in terms of the LRA — a statute expressly giving effect to s 23 of the
Constitution.
11 Section 188(1)(a)(ii) LRA.
12 See Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board (2004) 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC), discussed
below.
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employment relationship13 This era ended in 1979 with far-reaching
amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act,14 following the report of the
Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, and the establish-
ment of an Industrial Court with the power to ‘determine’ ‘unfair labour
practices’ — a notion deﬁned so loosely as to be capable of including the
exercise of contractual rights. A classic example was the power of the court to
decide on the ‘fairness’ of lawful termination of a contract of employment by
an employer and, if deeming it unfair, to strike it down.15 Potentially, the
Industrial Court had the same power to overrule any other contractual right
in the name of ‘fairness’, thus placing the status of the employment contract
as a deﬁnitive source of rights and duties in limbo.
This remarkable development is explained by the equally remarkable
nature of the period in which it took place. Employment law deals, at the
best of times, with ‘a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not
a bearer of power’.16 The 1980s in South Africa, when the Industrial Court
went about its work, was not the best of times. It was a deeply troubled
decade which saw the critical stages of the struggle against apartheid,
nowhere more so than in the labour arena. Historically, the power of white
employers over black workers had been exercised in an untrammelled and
often tyrannical manner, backed by a violently oppressive state and a racially
exclusive political system. Every aspect of this system was called into
question by the upheavals from the mid–1970s onwards. The legal
subjugation of black workers provoked growing resistance from an emergent
trade union movement (as well as criticism and calls for change from a new
generation of lawyers).17 By the end of the 1970s, as the Wiehahn
Commission understood, the situation was threatening to become unten-
able.18 To stem the tide it was necessary to remove the main causes of
conﬂict. Industrial stability could not be achieved without bringing
13 See, in general, C Norman-Scoble Law of Master and Servant in South Africa
(1956). For a comprehensive analysis of the employment relationship in SouthAfrica,
see Martin Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 (looseleaf), especially ss B and C.
See also Rycroft & Jordaan op cit note 1 chap 1; Francois du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles
of South African Law 9 ed (2007) chap 29; Grogan op cit note 3 chaps 2–7.
14 Act 28 of 1956, renamed the LabourRelationsAct byAct 57 of 1981.
15 Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (1986) 7 ILJ 108
(W); Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v The President of the Industrial Court (1986) 7 ILJ
152 (T).
16 Davies & Freedland op cit note 4 at 18.
17 Cf Nicholas Haysom & Clive Thompson ‘Labouring under the law: South
Africa’s farmworkers (1986) 7 ILJ 218; Susan Flint ‘The protection of domestic work-
ers in SouthAfrica:Acomparative study’Part 1 (1988) 9 ILJ 1; Part 2 (1988) 9 ILJ 187;
Paul Benjamin ‘An accident of history: Who is (and who should be) an employee
under SouthAfrican labour law?’ (2004) 25 ILJ 787.
18 For a brief but vivid overview of the manner in which the Wiehahn Commis-
sion responded to ‘the internal and external forces ranged against the status quo of the
seventies’, see Clive Thompson ‘Twenty-ﬁve years after Wiehahn — A story of the
unexpected and the not quite intended’ (2004) 25 ILJ iii.
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organized black labour into the collective bargaining system; conﬂict in the
workplace could not be contained without placing limits on ‘the unbridled
common law power of the employer’.19 From a legal perspective the latter
proposition was especially challenging. On the one hand, change in the
workplace regime was urgently needed; on the other hand, as an institution
deeply embedded in the common law, the contract of employment was
resistant to rapid change.20 Under such circumstances legislation is normally
the instrument of reform but, given the nature of government at the time, an
employment statute curbing employers’ powers and entrenching workers’
fundamental rights would have been too much to expect.
In the event, the Industrial Court became the agent of change with the
notion of ‘fairness’, rather than ‘lawfulness’, as the touchstone of its
jurisprudence. This, in turn, made it necessary to move beyond the
contractual paradigm in order to explain the new relationship between
employer and worker. Internationally, similar questions had been raised by
legal scholars: in particular, the notion of ‘contract’ as conceptual framework
for the relationship between employers and employees in the modern
industrial economy had come under the spotlight.21 Although in South
Africa the debate did not stand out amidst the burning issues of the time, it
was perhaps inevitable that the notion of ‘employment relationship’, as
opposed to ‘contractual relationship’, would become accepted as the
theoretical basis for the jurisprudence of the Industrial Court. It happened by
degrees. In Steel, Engineering & Allied Workers Union of SA v Trident Steel (Pty)
Ltd22 Landman AM ﬁrst distinguished between ‘the narrow contractual
relationship between the respondent and its employees [and] the wider
employment relationship which existed between them’. Following several
contrary decisions by the Industrial Court, the Appellate Division eventually
upheld the notion of an ‘employment relationship’ capable of existing
outside the bounds of contract, governed by equity and terminating only
‘when both parties so agree, or when equity permits’.23 Van den Heever JA
(guided, ironically, by common-law principles)24 concluded that ‘[t]he
unmistakable intent of labour legislation generally, is to intrude, or permit
19 Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle & Clive Thompson The New Labour Relations
Act: The Law after the 1988 Amendments (1989) 6.
20 Cf the observations by Marais J in Martin v Murray (1995) 16 ILJ 589 (C) at 600,
cited by Malcolm Wallis ‘The LRA and common law’ (2005) 9 Law, Democracy &
Development 181 at 185fn18.
21 SeeRycroft & Jordaan op cit note 1 chap 1.
22 (1986) 7 ILJ 86 (IC) at 91.
23 National Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Borg-Warner SA (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15
ILJ 509 (A) at 518. Barney Jordaan adds: ‘It is . . . normally assumed that . . .[the
employment] relationship merely exists between the employee and the employer. In
reality, however, that relationship would seem to exist between the employee and the
undertaking itself’: ‘Transfer, closure and insolvency of undertakings’ (1991) 12 ILJ
935 at 953, with reference to Building Construction & Allied Workers Union v Masterbilt
CC (1987) 8 ILJ 670 (IC).
24 Wallis op cit note 20 at 183.
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the intrusion of third parties, on . . . [the contractual] relationship in
innumerable ways’.25 In fact, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the
Industrial Court, armed with its unfair-labour-practice jurisdiction, kept up
such ‘intrusion’, persistently mitigating the common-law powers of employ-
ers in the quest for industrial peace and the promotion of collective
bargaining. The body of case law that emerged brought SouthAfrican labour
law broadly in line with international standards, albeit not always consis-
tently, and with little help from the common law.26
At the dawn of the new South Africa, then, the contract of employment
might well have seemed little more than a historical relic — except in the
minds of a few die-hard lawyers of the old school. At the very least there was
a (perceived) chasm between the common law and the prevailing statutory
regime.27 The question in practice was not so much whether an employer’s
or employee’s conduct was lawful but whether it was ‘fair’. Identifying the
criteria of ‘fairness’ was the main task of labour lawyers.
This era, in turn, ended with the promulgation of the Labour Relations
Act of 1995 which, in a dramatic break with the previous decade and a half,
abandoned the broad deﬁnition of ‘unfair labour practice’. Two main factors
accounted for this change. First, the Act codiﬁed most of the jurisprudence
of the Industrial Court determining what was ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ in the
employment relationship. Secondly, in contrast to its predecessor, the new
Act was driven by a voluntaristic vision of collective bargaining, making it
necessary to abolish the power of compelling collective bargaining by order
of court. This, in turn, meant narrowing down the deﬁnition of ‘unfair
labour practice’ to speciﬁc forms of individual conduct in order to avoid the
possibility of judicial ‘intrusion’ into the collective bargaining arena. The
implications of this change, while much debated in relation to collective
bargaining, were not immediately realized in the context of individual labour
law.28 The Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the Draft Labour
25 NAAWU v Borg-Warner supra note 23 at 515.
26 In Die Raad van Mynvakbonde v Die Kamer van Mynwese van Suid-Afrika (1984) 5
ILJ 344 (IC) the Industrial Court held that its unfair-labour-practice jurisdiction did
not allow it to amend the common law, even though it could overrule it (at 362H). In
this sense, though in practice the employment relationship was radically transformed,
in theory the contract of employment survived the 1980s unscathed; at most, rules
laid down by the Industrial Court might have been regarded as implied terms of
speciﬁc employment contracts: cf Key Delta v Marriner [1998] 6 BLLR 647 (E) (dis-
cussed below).
27 As Froneman DJP put it: ‘Prior to the . . . enactment of the Constitution, our
law maintained a rigid distinction between a common law contract of employment,
which was said to have nothing to do with fairness, and a statutory labour dispensa-
tion, which had much to do with fairness’: Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (1)
SA49 (SCA) para 3.
28 See, e g, Barney Jordaan ‘Collective bargaining under the new LabourRelations
Act: The resurrection of freedom of contract’ (1997) 1 Law, Democracy & Development
1.
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Relations Bill29 commented only that the ‘residual unfair labour practice
deﬁnition [was] conﬁned to individual unfair labour practices’ other than
dismissal disputes. Nothing was said about individual disputes falling outside
that deﬁnition. Likewise, neither the CCMA nor the Labour Court was
given jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes;30 such jurisdiction
(concurrent with that of the ‘civil courts’) would only be conferred on the
Labour Court by the Basic Conditions of EmploymentAct31 some two years
later.32
In fact, the revival of freedom of contract at the collective level meant its
reassertion at the individual level too. As in pre-Industrial-Court times, the
absence of an open-ended jurisdiction in respect of unfair labour practices
left the courts no room to interfere with a contract of employment except to
strike down unlawfulness. But here the resemblance with the earlier period
ended. The enactment of a Constitution containing a justiciable Bill of
Rights in 1993 marked a sea-change that would leave no area of law,
including employment law, unaffected. Not only did it require the
enactment of new labour legislation, but it also necessitated a reassessment of
the common law. In the ﬁrst place, it meant that contractual terms were
invalid not only if they were unlawful but also to the extent that they were
unconstitutional. It also meant that, in certain circumstances, common-law
rules (like legislation) had to be interpreted to give effect to constitutional
rights and values as well as international law.
To lawyers schooled in Roman-Dutch law, the idea of the unlawfulness of
contractual obligations presented no difﬁculty. Far more challenging was the
task of interpreting labour rights (statutory and contractual) within the
matrix of the Constitution and international law — a task which, to this day,
continues to present the South African labour courts with considerable
difﬁculties. For this reason it is proposed brieﬂy to consider what the
constitutional framework involves before proceeding to the question that
29 GGa16259 of 10 February 1995 at 154.
30 Ackron v Northern Province Development Corporation [1998] 9 BLLR 916 (LC) para
29; Gaylard v Telkom South Africa Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 1624 (LC) para 18. As was
observed in Maseko v Entitlement Experts [1997] 3 BLLR 317 (CCMA) at 320: ‘The
Act is severely defective in various respects insofar as the individual employer or
employee is concerned.’
31 Section 77(3) the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (‘BCEA’).
For cases in which this jurisdiction was ﬁrst exercised, see Penta Publication (Pty) Ltd v
Schoombie (2000) 21 ILJ 1833 (LC); Brickman v Community Growth Asset Management
(2000) 21 ILJ 2403 (LC).
32 It would take another four years before the Labour Court received the power of
‘making a determination that it considers reasonable on any matter concerning a
contract of employment in terms of section 77(3), which determination may include
an order for speciﬁc performance, an award of damages or an award of compensa-
tion’: s 77A(e), introduced by Act 11 of 2002. This formulation leaves open the
question on which speciﬁc grounds the Labour Court may strike down contractual
terms and conditions which it considers ‘unreasonable’.
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forms the focus of the article: the relationship between common law and
statute in the employment context.33
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The starting point for present purposes is s 23 of the Constitution (the
‘labour clause’) and, in particular, the right to ‘fair labour practices’ which it
entrenches.34 The exact content of this open-ended term, so reminiscent of
that deﬁning the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, was left for the
legislature and the courts to delineate.35 The Constitutional Court has
approached the question thus:
‘Our Constitution is unique in constitutionalising the right to fair labour
practice. But the concept is not deﬁned in the Constitution. The concept of fair
labour practice is incapable of precise deﬁnition. This problem is compounded
by the tension between the interests of the workers and the interests of the
employers that is inherent in labour relations. Indeed, what is fair depends upon
the circumstances of a particular case and essentially involves a value judgment.
It is therefore neither necessary nor desirable to deﬁne this concept.
The concept of fair labour practice must be given content by the legislature
and thereafter left to gather meaning, in the ﬁrst instance, from the decisions of
the specialist tribunals including the LAC and the Labour Court. These courts
and tribunals are responsible for overseeing the interpretation and application
of the LRA, a statute which was enacted to give effect to s 23(1). In giving
content to this concept the Courts and tribunals will have to seek guidance
from domestic and international experience. Domestic experience is reﬂected
both in the equity-based jurisprudence generated by the unfair labour practice
provision of the 1956 LRA as well as the codiﬁcation of unfair labour practice
in the LRA. International experience is reﬂected in the Conventions and
Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation. Of course other
comparable foreign instruments such as the European Social Charter 1961 as
revised may provide guidance.’ (Footnotes omitted.)36
33 On the interpretation of labour law to ‘give effect to’ and ‘in compliance with’
the Constitution and international law, see Darcy Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law:
A Comprehensive Guide 5 ed (2006) chap 2. For more detailed discussion, see Dennis
Davis, Halton Cheadle & Nicholas Haysom (eds) Fundamental Rights in the Constitu-
tion (1997) 3ff; M H Cheadle, D M Davis & N R L Haysom (eds) South African
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2005) (looseleaf) chap 3.
34 Section 23 of the ﬁnal Constitution superseded the equivalent s 27 of the
interim Constitution of 1993, in terms of which the LRA was enacted. Section
157(2) of the LRAadds that ‘[t]he Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
High Court in respect of any alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental right
entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
and arising from [inter alia] employment and from labour relations’. (Emphasis added.)
35 Given that fairness at the collective level is comprehensively codiﬁed by the
LRA and entrenched by the remainder of s 23, it has been argued, the right to ‘fair
labour practices’ in s 23(1) should be understood as applying at the individual level
only: Brassey op cit note 13 at C3:6 with reference to Cheadle in Davis, Cheadle &
Haysom op cit note 33 at 213.
36 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 (3) SA1 (CC) paras 33–4.
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Given this generalization, how far does the right extend? Does it give the
Labour Court, and possibly even the CCMA, a power similar to that of the
Industrial Court to strike down labour practices, including contractual rights
and obligations that are found to be ‘unfair’?
Arbitrators and judges have from the start set their face against such an
interpretation. The CCMAhas interpreted its jurisdiction as being limited to
those types of disputes which the Act expressly allows it to entertain — thus
excluding, for example, complaints by employers against employees37 and
contractual disputes.38 The Labour Court, similarly, was reluctant to assume
a power of enforcing ‘fair labour practices’ over and above those expressly
codiﬁed in the Act.39 Thus, in Denel Informatics Staff Association v Denel
Informatics (Pty) Ltd40 Basson J held that the LRA ‘creates legal procedures by
way of which employees and employers can enforce and give effect to their
fundamental rights which are entrenched in the labour relations clause
(section 23) of the Constitution’. This, indeed, follows from s 1(a) of the
LRA, stating that it is a ‘primary object’ of the Act ‘to give effect to and
regulate the fundamental rights conferred by [s 23] of the Constitution’. It is
well established that, where a fundamental right is regulated by means of
legislation, then such legislation — and not the underlying constitutional
right — becomes the primary means for giving effect to the latter.41 The
effect was explained as follows by Conradie J in NAPTOSA v Minister of
Education, Western Cape:42
‘If an employer adopts a labour practice which is thought to be unfair, an
aggrieved employee would in the ﬁrst instance be obliged to seek a remedy
37 NEWU v CCMA (2007) 28 ILJ 1223 (LAC); Maseko v Entitlement Experts supra
note 30. The CCMA is, however, not precluded from interpreting and applying
constitutional rights in matters that come before it: Department of Justice v CCMA
(2004) 25 ILJ 248 (LAC); and see ss 8(1) and 39(2) of the Constitution.
38 Cf Langeveldt v Vryburg Transitional Local Council (2001) 22 ILJ 1116 (LAC) para
54; Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2005) 26 ILJ 1105 (LC) paras 33–8.
39 See 3M SA (Pty) Ltd v SACCAWU (2001) 22 ILJ 1092 (LAC) para 17, where
Zondo JP held that ‘[t]he only fairness that [the labour courts] apply in dealing with
matters which come before them is such fairness as they are speciﬁcally required to
apply in speciﬁc sections of the Act in respect of speciﬁc types of disputes as well as
such fairness as every Court of law is required to observe in terms of the rules of
natural justice’. This was, however, with reference to the categorization of the
Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court as courts of ‘equity’ rather than to s 23(1) of
the Constitution.
40 (1999) 20 ILJ 137 (LC) paras 18–19; conﬁrmed in Fredericks v MEC for Education
and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (2) SA 693 (CC). See also Bensingh v Minister of
Education and Culture: Province of the Kwazulu-Natal (2003) 24 ILJ 1098 (D).
41 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para
437; Institute for Democracy in SA v African National Congress 2005 (5) SA39 (C) para 17.
See also Davis, Cheadle &Haysom op cit note 33 at 215–17.
42 2001 (2) SA 112 (C) at 122; referred to approvingly by Ngcobo J in Minister of
Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd supra note 41and endorsed by the unani-
mous Constitutional Court in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence
2007 (5) SA400 (CC) para 51.
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under the LRA. If he or she ﬁnds no remedy under that Act, the LRA might
come under constitutional scrutiny for not giving adequate protection to a
constitutional right. If a labour practice permitted by the LRA is not fair, a
Court might be persuaded to strike down the impugned provision. But it
would, I think, need a good deal of persuasion.’
However, it has also been held that the LRAdoes not regulate the concept
of ‘fair labour practices’ exhaustively and that the omission of protection
against a particular form of unfairness need not render it unconstitutional.43
It is submitted that this is correct. Where the LRA (or any other statute) fails
to provide a means of enforcing a constitutional right, the common law
should be applied or developed to do so;44 and, if this cannot be done, the
constitutional right may be relied upon directly.45 ‘Constitutional scrutiny’
therefore does not necessarily mean that a provision of the LRA which fails
to give effect to the right to fair labour practices in all its aspects in any given
context is per se invalid. Rather, it may reveal a hiatus which can be
remedied by developing the common law or relying on the constitutional
right itself.
A similar approach, it will be argued, should be followed when seeking to
interpret a contract of employment in accordance with the Constitution.46 If
a common-law principle exists that is capable of being ‘developed’ to give
effect to the right to fair labour practices in such a situation, it should be
construed accordingly. But, if no such principle exists, direct reliance on
s 23(1) of the Constitution should be possible.
What happens if a contractual term is prima facie in conﬂict with a basic
right? The enquiry in such an event is similar but not identical47 to that used
in testing the constitutionality of a statutory or common-law rule. In
principle, such a term ought to be invalid. However, a distinction must be
drawn between rights that are so fundamental that they cannot under any
43 NEWU v CCMA [2004] 2 BLLR 165 (LC) at 168.
44 Section 8(3) of the Constitution; and see the minority judgment of Froneman
AJA in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt supra note 27 para 4.
45 Simela v MEC for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape [2001] 9 BLLR 1085
(LC) para 56. Contra, see the view of Conradie J in NAPTOSA v Minister of Educa-
tion, Western Cape supra note 42 at 123 that, ‘[t]aking into account the right to fair
labour practices and the duties imposed thereby on employers and employees alike, it
is not a right which can, without an intervening regulatory framework, be applied
directly in the workplace. The social and policy issues are too complex for that’.
46 Parties to an employment relationship are bound by the horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights: see Darcy DuToit ‘Labour and the Bill of Rights’ in Bill of Rights
Compendium (1996) (looseleaf, issue 13) para 4B23 citing Erika De Wet ‘A German
perspective on the constitutional enforceability of children’s and labour rights in the
interim bill of rights with special reference to Drittwirkung’ (1996) 59 THRHR 577 at
589; Barney Jordaan ‘The new Constitution and labour law’ (1996) 6(1) Labour Law
News and Court Reports 1 at 2; Martin Brassey & Carole Cooper ‘Labour relations’ in
Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 1 (1996) at 30–3.
47 That is, because the ‘limitation clause’ (s 36 of the Constitution) permits the
limitation of basic rights only by law of general application; there is no provision for
limitation by private persons.
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circumstances be excluded by agreement48 and those of which the purported
exclusion is open to interpretation. For example, a restraint of trade clause is
not automatically invalid even though it limits the fundamental right ‘to
choose [a] trade, occupation or profession freely’.49 In terms of the common
law, generally speaking, a restraint clause is valid provided that enforcement
thereof will not be contrary to public policy.50 In such a case, where a
limitation of a basic right is permitted by a common-law rule, the inquiry
shifts to the validity of the latter rule in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution. If
the rule does not pass the test, the contractual term must likewise be
invalid.51
CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
What, then, is the position when a term (express or implied) of a contract of
employment, and the attendant contractual remedy, coincide with a
statutory right or remedy enacted by the legislature in accordance with the
right to fair labour practices? In many cases, of course, the statute itself will
specify the scope (if any) for varying its requirements by agreement.52 But if
nothing is said, does the statutory remedy supersede the contractual remedy?
As is well known, this question was answered in the negative by the
Supreme Court ofAppeal in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt.53 At issue in this
matter was the right of an employee whose ﬁxed-term contract of
48 For example, protection against unfair discrimination: Parry v Astral Operations
Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 1479 (LC) para 58. Hepple describes such rights as ‘inderogable’: see
Bob Hepple Rights at Work: Global, European and British perspectives (2005) 20 (under
the heading ‘The common law and statutory rights’), with reference to LordWedder-
burn ‘Inderogability, collective agreements, and community law’ (1992) 21 ILJ (UK)
245.
49 Section 22 of the Constitution.
50 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). In general,
see J T R Gibson South African Mercantile & Company Law 7 ed (1997) at 78–81. The
Bill of Rights has been described as ‘an exceptionally reliable statement of seriously
considered public opinion’, although ‘it would be a mistake to treat its provisions as
the last word on public policy’ – the latter is a broader concept in that additional
principles, such as freedom of contract, may also be part thereof: R H Christie ‘The
law of contract and the Bill of Rights’ in Bill of Rights Compendium (1996) (looseleaf) at
3H10–3H11.
51 In the case of restraint of trade agreements, it has been held that the common-
law rule is consistent with the Constitution. The question of onus, however, is
unsettled: cf Kotze en Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C); Knox D’Arcy
Limited v Shaw 1996 (2) SA 651 (W); Canon Kwazulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office
Automation v Booth 2005 (3) SA205 (N).
52 For example, s 49(3) of the BCEAand s 197(2) of the LRA.
53 Supra note 27. See also WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen supra
note 4, where the previous Labour Appeal Court reached a similar conclusion, and
Jacot-Guillarmod v Provincial Government, Gauteng 1999 (3) SA594 (T) where the High
Court treated a dispute similar to that in Fedlife as one concerning the enforcement of
an employment contract. For a critical analysis of the Fedlife judgment, see John
Grogan ‘Which court when – and why? – Jurisdiction over employment disputes’
Employment Law Journal December 2001.
OIL ON TROUBLED WATERS? 105
employment had been terminated prematurely to claim damages for breach
of contract rather than seeking a remedy for unfair dismissal in terms of the
LRA.54 The practical importance of the question was (and is) that statutory
compensation for unfair dismissal must be ‘just and equitable in all the
circumstances’ but may not exceed the equivalent of twelve months’
remuneration (or, in the case of automatically unfair dismissal, twenty-four
months’ remuneration)55 whereas common-law damages have no a priori
limits. The majority of the court found that the LRA did not ‘expressly
abrogate an employee’s common-law entitlement to enforce contractual
rights’, nor did it do so by necessary implication.56 This means that
employees, certainly in disputes arising from the termination of employ-
ment, may choose whether to base their action on their contractual rights or
on the LRA.57 This ruling has not gone without criticism, which will be
considered below.58 It is, however, the law.59
The effect, on the face of it, is to create a dualistic model of dispute
resolution, consisting of statutory remedies mirrored by their common-law
counterparts and, hence, two parallel streams of jurisprudence. It is, of
course, not all-pervasive. Common-law rules, as was conﬁrmed in Fedlife,
fall away to the extent that they are expressly overruled or in direct conﬂict
with legislation. The Constitution, and legislation giving effect to the
Constitution, should therefore be the starting point in identifying employ-
ment rights and duties. The common law is no more than ‘residuary’,
‘subordinate’ to legislation, operative only ‘when no statute or [collective]
54 See s 193 LRA. In practice, the question is only likely to arise in respect of
ﬁxed-term contracts, in that contractual damages for unlawful termination of an
indeﬁnite contract will generally be limited to ‘notice pay’ — i e, well below the
statutory maximum — while in the case of ﬁxed-term contracts with an extensive
period left to run it may be considerably higher.
55 See s 194 LRA. ‘Automatically unfair dismissal’, generally, refers to dismissal for
reasons so offensive to public policy as to be unjustiﬁable under any circumstances:
see s 187 LRA.
56 Paragraph 17.
57 This may be contrasted with the distinction drawn in the UK between ‘unfair
dismissal’ in terms of the Employment RightsAct 1996 and ‘wrongful dismissal’ based
on breach of contract, ie dismissal without due notice.As discussed below, the House
of Lords has excluded what may be termed the substantive fairness of dismissal from
the purview of the common law.
58 The opposing view being that, where the facts of an applicant’s case bring it
within the ambit of a statutory remedy, the common-law remedy should be
excluded: see the minority judgment of FronemanAJA in the same matter, discussed
below.
59 While the judgment does not deal with other categories of dispute, it has been
suggested that a similar approach should be followed in all cases where a statutory
right overlaps with a contractual right — that is, it should be assessed whether the
statute expressly or by implication abolishes the contractual remedy: see Christoph
Garbers ‘The battle of the courts: Forum shopping in the aftermath of Wolfaardt and
Fredericks’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 97 at 106.
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agreement prevails’.60 Even so, Brassey has suggested, it remains important in
two respects:
• it provides concurrent causes of action in the ordinary courts; and
• it is ‘the embodiment of equity’.61
The ﬁrst proposition is illustrated by the Fedlife judgment (above). The
second would seem to need some qualiﬁcation. It is undeniable that the
common law is a source of equitable principles. To see it as the
‘embodiment’ thereof, however, does not sit easily with the existence of a
Bill of Rights which, arguably, is the ultimate source of equity in our law.62 It
is true that the Bill of Rights mandates recourse to, and development of, the
common law as one means of realizing its objectives where legislation is
silent.63 This shows that the interaction between common law, the
Constitution and statute is not a one-way process. The very need for the
enactment of a series of statutes to give effect to constitutional provisions
such as the labour clause, however, reminds us that the common law, in
itself, cannot underpin an equitable regime consistent with the right to fair
labour practices. To achieve that requires a combination of statutory rules
and contractual principles, the former devised and the latter (to the extent
that hiati remain) interpreted in accordance with the Bill of Rights. To this
extent, the common law can no longer be regarded as an autonomous source
of law separate from the Constitution.64
The picture that emerges is thoroughly dialectical. Labour statutes are
superimposed on common law while, at the same time, common-law
principles are interwoven with statutory rules, giving them content or
helping to deﬁne their scope. Both, however, are informed and limited by
the Constitution. Viewed thus, employment law presents not so much a
dichotomy between statute and common law but, rather, a continuum
ranging from statutory rights at one end to contractual rights at the other,
60 Martin Brassey ‘Common law: Opportunities and obstacles’Unpublished paper
delivered at the 6thAnnual Conference of the SouthAfrican Society for Labour Law
2003.
61 Ibid.
62 The Bill of Rights ‘ ‘‘enshrines the rights of all people in our country’’ [s 7(1) of
the Constitution] and afﬁrms the foundational values of human dignity, equality and
freedom. Courts must give expression to these foundational values when construing
any legislation’: Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) para 45. The term
‘equity’, though undeﬁned in our law, literally denotes fair and impartial treatment.
As such it is integral to the ‘foundational values’ of the Constitution and must inform
the interpretation of all laws in accordance with the Constitution.
63 Section 8(3), read with s 39(2).
64 Thus, Kentridge AJ warns that ‘constitutional rights conferred without express
limitation should not be cut down by reading implicit restrictions into them, so as to
bring them into line with the common law’: S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA642 (CC) para 15;
and see J R de Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 172, who argues
that ‘extreme caution is called for in interpreting the Constitution insofar as reliance is
placed on the common law’. See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA490 (CC) paras 22 and 25.
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with a considerable interface in between where it is difﬁcult or impossible to
separate one from the other. It is in this intermediate zone that the
ambiguities alluded to in the Introduction to this article are located; and,
from what has been said, it follows that these can only be resolved in the light
of the constitutional principles that underpin both common law and statute.
To illustrate the point, two examples will be considered: (a) the deﬁnition
of ‘dismissal’ in s 186 of the LRA; and (b) the relationship between the
concept of ‘unfair dismissal’ and that of unlawful termination of the
employment contract.65
(a) The definition of ‘dismissal’
As early as 1995, P A K le Roux noted that, on the face of it, the LRA’s
deﬁnition of ‘dismissal’ is essentially limited to employees employed in terms
of a contract of employment.66 The statutory deﬁnition of ‘employee’, on
the other hand, includes persons who ‘in any manner [assist] in the carrying
on or conducting the business of an employer’ [s 213]. This formulation is
broad enough to include persons working for an employer without a valid
contract of employment.67 In s 186(1) of the LRA, however, ‘dismissal’ is
equated with termination (or non-renewal) of a ‘contract of employment’;
and, to gain access to the CCMA, a dismissed employee must prove
‘dismissal’ in this sense.68 On a strict reading of the Act, therefore, workers
without a valid contract of employment cannot be ‘dismissed’ and thus do
not qualify for protection in terms of the LRA.69 It is submitted that this
cannot have been the intention.70 The only way of avoiding it is to interpret
65 Other examples of potential overlap include the circumstances under which the
Labour Court may award sentimental damages as part of compensation (Minister of
Justice v Bosch NO (2006) 27 ILJ 166 (LC)) and the power assumed by the High Court
to review disciplinary proceedings by private employers (Feinberg v African Bank Ltd
(2004) 25 ILJ 217 (T)). Further instances are mentioned elsewhere the article.
66 With the exception, that is, of the atypical forms of dismissal described in
s 186(1)(c) (not allowing an employee to resume work after taking maternity leave)
and (d) (selective non-re-employment). See P A K le Roux ‘Developments in indi-
vidual labour law’ inHaltonCheadle et al Current Labour Law (1995) 3–4.
67 For example, a foreigner without a valid work permit, or an unassisted minor
whose guardian repudiates the contract. In White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd (2006)
27 ILJ 2721 (LC) at 2727J–2728A Oosthuizen AJ accepted that the existence of an
employment relationship is ‘not dependent solely upon the conclusion of a contract
recognized at common law as valid and enforceable’. See also Rumbles v Kwa Bat
Marketing (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1587 (LC) para 17; Church of the Province of Southern
Africa (Diocese of Cape Town) v CCMA (2001) 22 ILJ 2274 (LC) para 29.
68 Section 192(1) LRA.
69 See, for example, ‘Kylie’ and Van Zyl t/a Brigittes (2007) 28 ILJ 470 (CCMA).
The same applies to the BCEA and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘the
EEA’). For criticism, see Craig Bosch ‘Can unauthorized workers be regarded as
employees for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act?’ (2006) 27 ILJ 1342; Craig
Bosch & Sarah Christie ‘Are sex workers ‘‘employees’’?’ (2007) 28 ILJ 804.
70 ‘[T]he Bill of Rights, with certain express exceptions, applies to all persons
within the Republic, including [for example] illegal foreigners’: Lawyers for Human
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‘contract of employment’ in s 186 in a purposive sense as meaning ‘the
employment relationship’. In general, departure from the plain wording of a
statute is justiﬁed in circumstances where a literal reading would lead to ‘a
result contrary to the legislative intent’.71 The plain wording of s 186 would
imply unequal treatment of two categories of employees, as well as
discrimination between them, in almost certain conﬂict with subsecs 9(1)
and (2) of the Constitution.72 This cannot have been intended by the
legislature, nor is it consistent with the purposes of the Act. It is therefore
submitted that a broader reading of ‘contract of employment’, as suggested
above, is both justiﬁed and necessary.
The equation of ‘dismissal’ with termination of the contract of employ-
ment is awkward in other ways too. Repudiation is one of the ways in which
termination of a contract of employment can be triggered. Repudiation
happens where one party, expressly or by conduct, signiﬁes an intention not
to be bound by the contract. This gives the innocent party a choice whether
to reject the repudiation and hold the other party to the contract, or to accept
the repudiation and terminate the contract (usually accompanied by a claim
for damages).73 It is, in other words, the innocent party that terminates the
contract. The result is that, where an employer repudiates a contract of
employment (for example, by unlawfully purporting to terminate it without
notice) and the employee tacitly accepts it (typically, by acquiescing, in the
belief that the contract has in fact been ended) it is the employee and not the
employer who terminates the contract.74 This means, on a strict reading of
s 186(1), that no ‘dismissal’ has taken place, thus precluding the employee
from seeking relief in terms of the LRA. Bosch75 argues convincingly that,
under such circumstances, the act of repudiation by the employer rather than
its acceptance should be regarded as constituting ‘dismissal’ for purposes of
the Act; and, once again, there seems to be no other way of avoiding an
outcome that is manifestly at odds with the underlying purpose of the Act.
Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2003 (8) BCLR 891 (T) at 897; and see Lawyers for
Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) para 41’’, where the
Constitutional Court, while substituting the order made by the High Court,
endorsed the above principle. No category of persons is excluded from the protection
of s 23(1) of the Bill of Rights.
71 Adampol (Pty) Ltd vs Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (3) SA800 (A) at 804.
72 Section 9(2) prohibits the state from discriminating unfairly against anyone on
any ground, which has been held to include lack of South African citizenship: Larbi-
Odam v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) 1998 (1) SA
745 (CC).
73 In general, see François du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (2007)
866–70.
74 See, for example, Coetzee v Pitani (Pty) Ltd t/a Pitani Electrification Projects (2000)
21 ILJ 1324 (LC).
75 Craig Bosch ‘What’s in the word? Giving deﬁnition to ‘‘dismissal’’ ’ Paper pre-
sented to the 18th Annual Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg 2005, available at
www.irnetwork.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn= default.htm&vid=
irnetwork:10.1048/ enu (last accessed on 16 February 2008).
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Difﬁculties may also arise where an employee repudiates a contract,76 the
employer accepts the repudiation, and the employee claims unfair dismissal.
If the employee’s conduct is construed as termination of the contract without
due notice, and the employer acquiesces, it would mean that the contract
was ended by mutual agreement and, therefore, no dismissal took place.77 If
the employee’s conduct is construed as repudiation and the employer’s
conduct as acceptance thereof, on the other hand, the employer would have
terminated the contract,78 the LRAwould apply and the employer would be
exposed, at very least, to the cost and tribulations of arbitration and possible
legal proceedings. While under such circumstances the employer would
almost certainly be able to show a fair reason for ‘dismissal’, it is inherently
unlikely that any ‘fair procedure’ will have been followed. Even if no
compensation is ordered on this count, it seems incongruous that an
employer that has acted entirely reasonably in the circumstances should be
found to have acted unfairly.79 Once again, such an outcome can only be
avoided by giving the term ‘dismissal’ a meaning other than that stated in the
Act.80 To all intents and purposes, termination in the circumstances outlined
above is at the instance of the employee, not the employer. Given the object
of protecting employees from the unfair exercise of employers’ power, it is
suggested that cases of termination where the employer played no active role
fall beyond the scope of Chapter VIII of the LRA.81
(b) Unfair dismissal v unlawful termination of the employment contract
A major area of uncertainty, as already noted, is the coexistence of
contractual and statutory regimes based on the same employment relation-
ship and, consequently, a potential overlap between contractual and statutory
causes of action based on the same facts. One result, highlighted by the Fedlife
decision, is that different remedies may be available where causes of action
overlap, thus potentially frustrating any attempt by the legislature at
76 For example, by announcing a desire to cease working for the employer and lack
of conﬁdence in it: cf Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 (2) SA 1
(A), discussed below.
77 If the employee acted ‘in the heat of the moment’ and subsequently repented,
the employer might be able to prove misconduct but not to claim repudiation: see
CEPPWAWU v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC (2002) 23 ILJ 695 (LAC); Nashwa v
Unisel Gold Mine [1995] 9 BLLR 132 (IC); and see also the voluminous body of case
law and literature dealing with constructive dismissal.
78 Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen supra note 76.
79 Unless, that is, it is found on the facts that the employee had waived the right to a
fair procedure.
80 See, for example, Thubane v Hendlers Industrial Carriers [1997] 2 BLLR 131 (IC)
where it was found that an employee who had repudiated his contract of employment
was not ‘dismissed’.
81 Also relevant is the statutory object of promoting ‘the effective resolution of
labour disputes’ (s 1(d)(iv) LRA), which would not be served by opening an already
overburdened CCMA to disputes about the ‘fairness’ of an employer accepting repu-
diation by an employee.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL110
designing an appropriate remedy. Conversely, a cause of action may exist in
terms of the one system but not the other. This is not problematic in cases
where a statutory cause of action is created where the common law had
offered none; this is, after all, this is one of the purposes of legislation. It does,
however, become problematic if conduct provided for by statute is held to
be actionable in terms of common law. This is clearly in conﬂict with the
fundamental hierarchy of sources of law, in which legislation occupies a
higher tier.82 As will be seen, the risk of inadvertently reversing the roles is
inherent in the unsystematic enforcement of common-law rights and
remedies alongside their statutory counterparts.
Further uncertainty arises in respect of the extent of the overlap between
the two regimes. For example, does (fundamental) breach of contract by an
employee ipso facto amount to a fair reason for dismissal based on conduct in
terms of s 188 of the LRA? The answer is not self-evident. In most cases
breach of contract by an employee serious enough to warrant summary
termination will also amount to a fair reason for dismissal. However, two
different rules of law are involved: the question whether termination was
‘lawful’ is distinct from an inquiry whether it was ‘fair’ in terms of the Act.83
These various problems have been illustrated by a growing number of
decisions. For example, in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster84 a dismissed employee
claimed contractual damages from his former employer based on the latter’s
failure to adhere to its disciplinary procedure. In terms of the LRA it is
accepted that a disciplinary procedure, even when laid down in a collective
agreement,85 should be treated as a guideline rather than an inﬂexible code
and that deviations therefrom are not necessarily unfair.86 The employer in
this matter argued that the procedure it had followed was fair in terms of the
constitutional right to fair labour practices. However, the procedural rules
were also incorporated into the employee’s contract of employment; and
this, in the view of Nugent JA, made all the difference:
82 Compare Du Bois cit note 73 at 36.
83 Similarly, breach of contract by an employer (relating, for example, to discipline
short of dismissal) does not necessarily amount to an unfair labour practice: see Jonker
v Okhahlamba Municipality (2005) 26 ILJ 782 (LC); Mankahla v University of Transkei
[2004] 11 BALR 1340 (P).
84 2004 (4) SA481 (SCA).
85 Which, in general, trumps the individual contract: see ss 23(3) and 199 of the
LRA.
86 As was explained in NEHAWU v Director-General of Agriculture (1993) 14 ILJ
1488 (IC) at 1500: ‘the purpose of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 was the promo-
tion of good labour relations by way of striking down and remedying unfair labour
practices. To that end a strictly legalistic approach should yield to an equitable, fair
and reasonable exercise of rights; and insistence on uncompromising compliance
with a code, to substantial fairness, reasonableness and equity.’This approach has been
maintained in terms of the current Act: see Malelane Toyota v CCMA [1999] 6 BLLR
555 (LC); Highveld District Council v CCMA (2003) 24 ILJ 517 (LAC); Khula Enterprise
Finance Ltd v Madinane (2004) 25 ILJ 535 (LC); DuToit et al op cit note 33 at 396ff.
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‘If the new constitutional dispensation did have the effect of introducing into
the employment relationship a reciprocal duty to act fairly, it does not follow
that it deprives contractual terms of their effect. Such implied duties would
operate to ameliorate the effect of unfair terms in the contract, or even to
supplement the contractual terms where necessary, but not to deprive a fair
contract of its legal effect.’87
Had the disciplinary procedure not been incorporated in the employee’s
contract of employment, in other words, it might well have been open to the
employer to follow an alternative procedure provided it was fair. Merely
because it was so incorporated, however, the disciplinary procedure was
treated as strictly enforceable regardless of the fairness of the procedure
actually followed.88 In the absence of any material reason for insisting on
literal performance dictated by the facts of a particular case, it may well be
asked if such differentiation does not amount to elevating form above
substance.
A more nuanced view was taken in the subsequent matter of Riekert v
CCMA89 where the Labour Court, on review, overturned the ﬁnding of the
CCMA that an employer had been justiﬁed in disregarding key aspects of a
strict disciplinary code incorporated into an employee’s contract of employ-
ment. Nel AJ held as follows:
‘I am in agreement with the proposition that disciplinary codes are guidelines
and that an employer will not necessarily be regarded as having acted
procedurally unfairly if it did not comply with certain speciﬁc parts of its code.
[But] I do not believe that the fact . . . that disciplinary codes are guidelines can
under any circumstance be understood by employers as meaning that they may
chop and change the disciplinary procedures they have themselves set as and
when they wish to. Employees (and employers) are entitled to expect that their
employers (and employees) will comply with the prescribed rules of the game
as far as disciplinary enquiries go. . . .When an employer does not comply with
aspects of its own disciplinary procedures, there must be good reason shown for
its failure to comply with its own set of rules.’90
On this approach it would seem that a procedural rule embodied in a
contract of employment could be departed from if there is ‘good reason’ for
87 Paragraph 16.
88 AsNugent JAput it: ‘It might be that the construction advanced by the appellant
would create a disciplinary regime that was equally acceptable (whether that is so is by
no means certain) but that is not the test: through its disciplinary code, as incorpo-
rated in the conditions of employment, the appellant undertook to its employees that
it would follow a speciﬁc route before it terminated their employment and it was not
open to the appellant unilaterally to substitute something else’ (para 15). In contrast,
see Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality supra note 83 where time limits for disciplinary
action contained in a contract of employment were treated as ‘a guide’ and not
‘written in stone’ (para 20).
89 (2005) 14 LC 7.1.5.
90 Paragraph 22. In in this instance the employer’s departure from the agreed
procedure was found to have resulted in serious unfairness and, as a result, the dis-
missal was procedurally and substantively unfair.
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doing so, the procedure actually followed by the employer is fair, and the
employee suffers no prejudice as a result.
The picture is even less clear-cut when it comes to terms that were not
agreed by the parties but are alleged to be tacit. A case in point is Key Delta v
Marriner91 in which a dismissed employee based a claim for contractual
damages on the procedure followed by the employer in terminating his
employment as well as the alleged absence of a fair reason for dismissal. In
fact, the employee’s letter of appointment was silent on both matters. While
accepting that there is ‘no presumption in a contract of employment that the
employer requires a valid reason for dismissing its employee, nor that the
audi alteram partem rule has to be observed’,92 Erasmus J went on to reason
as follows:
‘[G]enerally employers and employees [at the time of the dismissal] were
conscious of the fact that under the Labour Relations Act arbitrary dismissal
amounted to an unfair labour practice. This translates into a more ready
inference that the parties tacitly incorporated such principles of fairness into
their agreement. It is of course not in itself decisive. The Court must establish
and give effect to the intention of the parties, as reﬂected in their agreement
seen in the light of the relevant surrounding circumstances.’
From the nature of the employee’s work, and the fact that the employer’s
defence was essentially to deny the unfairness alleged by the employee, the
court concluded that the parties had indeed intended to incorporate
requirements of substantive and procedural fairness into their agreement,
which duty the employer had breached.
Leaving aside the merits of the outcome, it is submitted that the method
followed by the court in reaching it is problematic. In general, a court ‘does
not readily import a tacit term’ into a contract.93 In the case of a written
contract, the parol evidence rule places formidable barriers in the way of
inferring terms other than those which the parties reduced to writing. In casu
the court based its ﬁnding primarily on the parties’ supposed understanding,
not at the time of concluding the contract, but at the time of the dismissal
(more than a year later) and on their subsequent conduct.94 One is left with a
91 [1998] 6 BLLR 647 (E). The case, on appeal from the Magistrate’s Court, was
heard before two judges.
92 At 651.
93 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA
506 (A) at 532H–533A, cited in Denel v Vorster supra note 84 para 15. The judgment
continues: ‘[The court] cannot make contracts for people; nor can it supplement the
agreement of the parties merely because it might be reasonable to do so. Before it can
imply a tacit term the Court must be satisﬁed, upon a consideration in a reasonable
and businesslike manner of the terms of the contract and the admissible evidence of
surrounding circumstances, that an implication necessarily arises that the parties
intended to contract on the basis of the suggested term.’
94 In other cases where the labour courts were prepared to relax the parol evidence
rule, the evidence considered admissible related to events leading up to or contempo-
raneous with the conclusion of the written agreement: SASBO v First National Bank
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sense that the manner in which the employer conducted its defence,95 rather
than the strength of the applicant’s case, was the deciding factor. This rather
technical victory establishes little by way of precedent but does raise
questions about the lengths to which a court may go in inferring the
existence of tacit contractual terms.96
Even more perplexing is the judgment in Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation
Board97 where an employee’s ﬁxed-term contract had been terminated
prematurely on the grounds of the employer’s operational requirements.
Remarkably, the LabourAppeal Court concluded that the dismissal had been
without a fair reason because, at common law, an employer may not
terminate a ﬁxed-term contract in the absence of agreement to that effect or
material breach by the employee.98 The LRA, it was held, had not amended
that principle.99 This raises at least two questions. First, it is difﬁcult to
understand how the unlawfulness of the termination of a contract in terms of
common law can be equated with lack of a fair reason for dismissal in terms of
the LRA. The fact that termination (and hence ‘dismissal’) was premature
says nothing about its reason or the fairness thereof. Secondly, the ﬁnding
that the LRA did not amend the common law relating to the termination of
ﬁxed-term contracts of employment is puzzling. In fact, the LRA amended
the common law profoundly by abolishing the employer’s right to terminate
an employment contract unless a ‘fair reason’ exists. In doing so, no
distinction was drawn between ﬁxed-term and indeﬁnite contracts.100 The
court in Buthelezi accepted that an employee’s conduct may provide a fair
reason to terminate a ﬁxed-term contract — and there is nothing in the Act
to indicate that an employer’s operational requirements should be treated
of Southern Africa Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 135 (IC); Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ
1256 (LAC).
95 That is, by denying unfairness rather than excepting to the claim as not disclos-
ing a cause of action.
96 As Bosch comments: ‘[I]mporting or constructing terms in particular cases
involves a more active interference by the courts in parties’ autonomy to contract as
opposed to simply accepting that at the outset there is a duty of good faith implied
into every contract of employment which may then be excluded or varied if the
parties apply their minds to it’: Craig Bosch ‘The implied term of trust and conﬁdence
in SouthAfrican labour law’(2006) 27 ILJ 28 at 50.
97 Supra note 12.
98 Under the heading ‘substantive unfairness’, the court expressed itself thus: ‘I
conclude that the respondent had no right in law to terminate the contract of
employment between itself and the appellant. Accordingly, the termination of such
contract before the end of its term was unfair and constituted an unfair dismissal.’
(Para 16).
99 Paragraph 12.
100 Section 185 and 188 LRA. The Act did not, in other words, preserve the
employer’s common-law right to terminate a ﬁxed-term contract without a reason as
an ‘alternative’ to the statutory dispensation, which would clearly have made non-
sense of s 188.
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any differently as a potential ground for dismissal.101 In my view, the right to
dismiss employees when operational requirements justify it (subject to ss 189
and 189A of the LRA) is part of the employer’s right to fair labour practices
and (in the language of Fedlife v Wolfaardt) does not seem to be excluded,
either expressly or by necessary implication, in respect of employees on
ﬁxed-term contract.
A CASE STUDY: THE COMMON-LAW DUTY OF ‘TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE’
A common difﬁculty runs through the judgments discussed above. The
problem is not that employees’ claims were upheld in most cases; if anything,
given that employee protection is a central purpose of labour law, that should
reinforce their authority. The problem is how it was done. The grounds on
which the cases were decided were for the most part technical rather than
substantive. If anything, this suggests an absence of legal principle clearly
entitling employees to the protection which the court saw ﬁt to provide.
Given the traditional function of statute in supplementing the deﬁciencies
of common law, this reversal of roles raises questions as to the adequacy of
the relevant provisions of the LRA. If the rights and remedies recognized by
the courts are implicit in the constitutional right to fair labour practices, was
the legislature not remiss in omitting them from theAct — or, if it did intend
employees to enjoy these protections, should the Act not have said so? If it is
left to the courts to construe such protections on a case-by-case basis, will we
not end up — as in the days of the Industrial Court — with ‘a confused
‘‘patchwork’’ jurisprudence’?102
Even if we embrace common law as a source of equitable principles (as we
must), does it follow that all those principles are consistent with the complex
of rights and duties created by the LRA and BCEA — which, after all, were
designed to give carefully balanced effect to basic constitutional rights? In
principle this may well be possible; indeed, the Constitution mandates the
courts to develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not
give effect to a constitutional right.103 Even then, the scope and content of
101 The court’s reasoning was that a ﬁxed-term contract cannot be terminated for
operational reasons because ‘the employer is free not to enter into a ﬁxed-term
contract but to conclude a contract for an indeﬁnite period if he thinks that there is a
risk that he might have to dispense with the employee’s services before the expiry of
the term’ (para 11). This assumes that the possibility of operational requirements
justifying dismissal should be foreseeable at the time of entering into the contract. In
my view, this hardly follows. Moreover, it is accepted that poor management on the
part of an employer, resulting in an operational need to dismiss, does not in itself
exclude substantive fairness: see Benjamin v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd (1998) 5 ILJ 595
(LC). Failure to anticipate a foreseeable risk of having to terminate a contract prema-
turely, it would seem, is a good example of this.
102 The expression is borrowed fromBosch op cit note 96.
103 Section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution.
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each ‘developed’ common-law rule in relation to its constitutional (and
general statutory) environment would need to be assessed in each instance.
A case in point is the implied contractual duty of trust and conﬁdence
existing between employer and employee.104 Its utility within a constitu-
tional matrix is clear. ‘[D]irect reliance on the [constitutional] right to fair
labour practices’, Bosch points out, ‘can be avoided by ﬂeshing out the
existing common law implied term of trust and conﬁdence.’105 Given its
constitutional resonance, it is suggested, the duty should be seen as ‘an
essentialium, and not a mere naturalium of the employment contract’.106
Moreover, there is no reason to fear the application of a general term
requiring employers ‘to act in a certain manner’:
‘It is important to set standards of behaviour so that the parties to the contract
know at the outset what kind of conduct is expected of them. This seems a
better approach than ﬁnding tacit terms to the effect that certain employer
conduct is unacceptable. Adopting that approach we are likely to develop a
confused ‘patchwork jurisprudence’ and the implied term of trust and
conﬁdence only becomes relevant at the stage where the employee seeks a
remedy.’107
Thus, in Fijen breach of this duty by an employee was held to constitute
repudiation, entitling the employer to dismiss the employee. It is, however,
important to note that this matter was decided on a purely contractual basis,
before the enactment of the Constitution and the current LRA. It is less clear
what would have happened if the court had been charged with interpreting
the duty of trust and conﬁdence in light of the constitutional right to fair
labour practices and the employee’s statutory protection against unfair
dismissal. For example, how would the employer’s duty of trust and
conﬁdence towards an employee relate to the latter’s statutory protection
104 See Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen supra note 77 where it was
held that ‘the relationship between employer and employee is in essence one of trust
and conﬁdence and that, at common law, conduct clearly inconsistent therewith
entitles the ‘‘innocent’’ party to cancel the agreement’ (at 9H). On the origin of the
term, seeHepple op cit note 48 at 18–20.
105 Bosch op cit note 96 at 31. He continues: ‘In addition, the right to fair labour
practices is not the only constitutional right protected by the implied term of trust and
conﬁdence. It might also be used to ensure proper respect for an employee’s rights to
dignity and possibly freedom and security of the person, particularly the right to
bodily and psychological integrity’(footnotes omitted).
106 Ibid at 51, with reference to Hepple op cit note 48. The argument is that
‘dignity, respect and equality are fundamental rights . . . [which] should not be
capable of being excluded by agreement; they are ‘‘inderogable’’ in the employment
context. To the extent that the implied term of trust and conﬁdence gives effect to
fundamental rights perhaps it should be seen as ‘‘unerasable’’ from the contract of
employment’: Hepple op cit note 48 at 31–2; and see Parry v Astral Operations Ltd
supra note 49.
107 Ibid at 50.
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against ‘constructive dismissal’?108 Would breach of that duty by an employer
amount to making continued employment ‘intolerable’ for the employee?
Or, following Fedlife v Wolfaardt, should the two sets of rights be treated as ‘oil
and water’, each to be interpreted in its own terms without reference to the
other? If so, is it possible that an employer might breach the common-law
duty (thus entitling the employee to terminate the contract and claim
damages, possibly in excess of the statutory limit) without necessarily
rendering continued employment ‘intolerable’? In this event, would the
statutory protection not become redundant? Put differently, how would one
construe the purpose of s 186(1)(e) in light of the injunction to interpret the
LRA to ‘give effect to its primary objects’,109 including that of regulating the
right to fair labour practices?
Nor is it clear how far the duty of ‘trust and conﬁdence’ extends.110 Does it
prohibit an employer from terminating a contract of employment for
(otherwise lawful) reasons inconsistent with that duty, thus entitling an
employee to damages if he or she is dismissed in this way? Some support for
such an approach can be found in related areas of law — for example, an
employer’s general duty of good faith in the context of a pension scheme.111
It may also be argued that such an extension of the duty is implicit in the
basic right to equal treatment — in other words, that the right to enforce
common-law remedies in addition to statutory remedies cannot (without
some constitutionally valid reason)112 be limited to employees on ﬁxed-term
contract (as in Fedlife and Buthelezi) but should be available to all employees.
And if one common-law duty of an employer remains enforceable — that is,
the duty not to terminate a ﬁxed-term contract prematurely — why not the
duty of trust and conﬁdence in general?
It will not be attempted to answer these questions deﬁnitively; rather, an
alternative basis for approaching them will be suggested. Sufﬁce it to note
that in Harper v Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of New York, Johannesburg113 the
108 Deﬁned as termination of the employment contract by an employee ‘because
the employer made continued employment intolerable’: s 186(1)(e) LRA.
109 Section 3(a) read with s 1.
110 The duty of trust and conﬁdence, Bosch suggests, overlaps with and may be
synonymous with the duty of good faith, although the latter may be more extensive:
Bosch op cit note 96 at 52.
111 Tek Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz 1999 (4) SA 884 (SCA); see Graham
Damant and Tashia Jithoo ‘The pension promise: Regulating employer conduct’
(2003) 24 ILJ 712 at 716–17.
112 Given that the right to equal treatment is premised on substantive rather than
formal equality, it implies ‘treating like alike’ while differentiating between unlike
cases. For an illuminating application of the principle, see Minister of Finance v Van
Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). On this basis it is arguable that the special position of
ﬁxed-term employees, bound up with the insecure nature of their employment,
justiﬁes the special protection extended to them in Fedlife v Wolfaardt supra note 27.
113 2004 (3) SA253 (W).
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High Court rejected the notion of an implied term of good faith114
overriding the right of the employer to terminate the contract on due notice.
Also in English law, the court noted, such a duty extends only to conduct
during the course of a contract of employment — that is, to the manner in
which the parties perform their duties — but not to the manner of its
termination, which is governed by statute.115
THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY
The last-mentioned judgment refocuses attention on a theme running
through all the cases discussed so far: rather than being merely about
forum-shopping, they are really about the relationship between the common
law and legislation. Legislation, as every lawyer knows, may amend the
common law or leave it unamended. To leave it at that, however, is to
misunderstand the role of legislation in a constitutional dispensation.
Legislation is the product of deliberate policy, informed by constitutional
imperatives and values, setting out to mould, supplement or replace
common-law rules in the light of those values as well as governmental duties
and socio-economic objectives derived from the Constitution. The LRA, in
particular, was drafted with careful reference to the requirements of the
Constitution and international law, following intensive negotiation between
government, business and labour.116 The protection of employees against
unfair termination of employment, balanced by the employer’s right to
terminate fairly, is a particularly sensitive aspect of the right to fair labour
practices. In the result ‘unfair dismissal’, to all intents and purposes, has been
placed on a par with fundamental breach of contract, accompanied by
speciﬁc, and no less carefully crafted, remedies.117 With regard to compensa-
tion for unfair dismissal the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Labour
Relations Bill of 1995 identiﬁed the problem implicit in a common-law
approach, which the Act set out to rectify, as follows:
‘In the absence of statutory guidelines or caps on compensation, which are the
norm in other countries, the courts have used tests applied in personal injury
claims to assess losses. Awards have become open-ended and, in the case of the
114 Bosch suggests that the duty of good faith and the duty of trust and conﬁdence
‘are synonymous, or that the duty of good faith encapsulates and extends what is
contained in the implied term’: Bosch op cit note 96 at 52.
115 Harper v Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of New York, Johannesburg supra note 5 paras
10–11with reference to Johnson v Unisys (discussed in the text to note 120 below).
116 All proposed labour legislation must be considered by the National Economic,
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a multipartite council with the pri-
mary object of ‘[promoting] the goals of economic growth, participation in eco-
nomic decisionmaking and social equity’: s 5(1) National Economic, Development
and Labour CouncilAct 35 of 1994.
117 See ss 193 and 194 LRA(as amended in 2002). For discussion, see Graham Giles
& Darcy du Toit ‘Compensation for unfair dismissal: How will the new section 194
work?’ (2002) 6 Law Democracy & Development 124.
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dismissal of executives, sometimes amount to hundreds of thousands of
rands.’118
It then put forward the proposed solution:
‘Without reinstatement, compensation must be open-ended and calculated on
a delictual damages basis. Because the draft Bill offers reinstatement as a primary
remedy, it caps compensation awards’.119
The thinking behind this approach was revealed more fully in the
judgment of the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Ltd.120 Observing that
‘this statutory system for dealing with unfair dismissals was set up by
Parliament to deal with the recognized deﬁciencies of the [common] law’
when it came to damages in dismissal disputes, Lord Hoffmann on behalf of
the majority interpreted the rationale of statutory compensation as follows:
‘The remedy adopted by Parliament was not to build upon the common law by
creating a statutory implied term that the power of dismissal should be
exercised fairly or in good faith, leaving the courts to give a remedy on general
principles of contractual damages. Instead, it set up an entirely new system
outside the ordinary courts, with tribunals staffed by a majority of lay members,
applying new statutory concepts and offering statutory remedies. Many of the
new rules, such as the exclusion of certain classes of employees and the limit on
the amount of the compensatory award, were not based upon any principle
which it would have been open to the courts to apply. They were based upon
policy and represented an attempt to balance fairness to employees against the
general economic interests of the community.’121
Next, Lord Hoffmann turned to the question ‘whether the courts should
develop the common law to give a parallel remedy which is not subject to
any such limit’, and dealt with it as follows:
‘I do not think that it is a proper exercise of the judicial function of the House
to take such a step. JudgeAnsell,122 to whose unreserved judgment I would pay
respectful tribute, went in my opinion to the heart of the matter when he said:
‘‘there is not one hint in the authorities that the . . . tens of thousands of people
that appear before the tribunals can have, as it were, a possible second bite in
common law and I ask myself, if this is the situation, why on earth do we have
this special statutory framework? What is the point of it if it can be
circumvented in this way?. . . . it would mean that effectively the statutory
limit on compensation for unfair dismissal would disappear.’’
I can see no answer to these questions. For the judiciary to construct a general
118 GG of 10 February 1995 at 140. Translated into today’s terms, ‘hundreds of
thousands’ would read ‘millions’. In itself, of course, this argument is inconclusive:
the question is not the size of an award but whether it is justiﬁed. The arguments for
capping compensation to anything less than contractual damages therefore deserve
careful scrutiny.
119 Ibid at 143.
120 [2001] UKHL 13, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2001/
13.html (last accessed 16 January 2008).
121 Paragraph 54.
122 Before whom, in the County Court, thematter was originally heard.
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common-law remedy for unfair circumstances attending dismissal would be to
go contrary to the evident intention of Parliament that there should be such a
remedy but that it should be limited in application and extent.’123
This approach was again endorsed by the House of Lords in the
subsequent matter of Eastwood v Magnox Electric Plc; McCabe v Cornwall
County Council124 where the rationale behind it was explained as follows:
‘In ﬁxing these limits on the amount of compensatory awards Parliament has
expressed its view on how the interests of employers and employees, and the
social and economic interests of the country as a whole, are best balanced in
cases of unfair dismissal. It is not for the courts to extend further a common law
implied term when this would depart signiﬁcantly from the balance set by the
legislature. To treat the statutory code as prescribing a ﬂoor and not a ceiling
would do just that. A common-law action for breach of an implied term not to
be dismissed unfairly would be inconsistent with the purpose Parliament
sought to achieve by imposing limits on the amount of compensatory awards
payable in respect of unfair dismissal.’125
It is not difﬁcult to apply the above reasoning in the South African
context, but, confronted with the same issue in Fedlife v Wolfaardt, the
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal preferred a different approach.
Although the court noted the ‘broad scheme’ of the LRA and acknowledged
the argument that ‘the material inroads made by the legislature upon the
right of employers to terminate contracts of employment in accordance with
their terms must necessarily have been intended to be balanced by the
abrogation of employees’ rights to enforce such contracts at common law’, it
nevertheless arrived at the following conclusion:
‘The clear purpose of the legislature when it introduced a remedy against unfair
dismissal in 1979 was to supplement the common-law rights of an employee
whose employment might be lawfully terminated at the will of the employer
(whether upon notice or summarily for breach). It was to provide an additional
right to an employee whose employment might be terminated lawfully but in
circumstances that were nevertheless unfair.’126
What, then, of the prevailing ‘broad scheme’of the LRA, designed sixteen
years after the original preﬁguration of a statutory remedy against unfair
dismissal in 1979 (alluded to above), informed by the Constitution and
international law? The court made no further reference to it, nor to the
solution it proposed (in the shape of s 194) to the problems linked to the
discretionary power of the Industrial Court to order compensation.127
Noting the question ‘whether [the 1995 Act] . . . deprived employees of
their pre-existing common-law right to enforce [ﬁxed-term] contracts,
123 Paragraph 57–8.
124 [2004] UKHL 35, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/
35.html (last accessed on 16 January 2008)
125 Paragraph 13.
126 Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt supra note 27 para 13.
127 See also the text to note 55 above.
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thereby conﬁning them to the remedies for ‘‘unlawful dismissal’’ as provided
for in the 1995 Act’, the court answered it tersely:
‘In considering whether the 1995Act should be construed to that effect it must
be borne in mind that it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to
interfere with existing law and a fortiori, not to deprive parties of existing
remedies for wrongs done to them. A statute will be construed as doing so only
if that appears expressly or by necessary implication’.128
This reasoning, it is respectfully submitted, fails to engage with the
purposes underlying the relevant provisions of the LRA; and it remains
conﬁned to the formal principles of common law, taking little account of the
constitutional context in which the common law must be interpreted. It
therefore does little to clarify what the appropriate balance should be
between ‘the interests of employers and employees and the social and
economic interests of the country as a whole’129 that are bound up in the
legal regulation of the remedy for dismissal. Grogan suggests that even in
terms of the formal statutory framework the judgment is questionable. Given
the concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court to deal with
contractual disputes, and the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it ‘in respect
of all matters in terms of [the BCEA]’, he points out that
‘[o]ne of the ‘‘matters’’ dealt with in the BCEA is the termination of
employment (Chapter 5). Section 37(6) provides that ‘‘nothing in this section
affects the right . . . of a dismissed employee to dispute the lawfulness or fairness
of the dismissal in terms of Chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act’’. . . . A
clearer indication that the legislature intended section 191 [providing for the
referral of unfair dismissal disputes in terms of the LRA] to cater for all
dismissals, irrespective of whether the complaint relates to alleged breach of
contract or unfairness, can hardly have been offered.’130
One is thus left with the question whether in Fedlife (as in Buthelezi and
Denel) the common-law cart was not being put before the (vibrant) horse of
statute. Is judge-made law taking precedence over legislative policy? Might
the Supreme Court of Appeal, or the Constitutional Court,131 decide the
issue differently in future if the purpose of the LRA in capping compensation
for unfair dismissal is considered fully? To ask the question is not to anticipate
any particular answer. The ﬁnal part of this article suggests a basis on which
the relief granted in Fedlife v Wolfaardt might conceivably be endorsed, albeit
a different one from that relied on by the court.
128 Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt supra note 27 para 15–16.
129 Eastwood v Magnox; McCabe v Cornwall County Council supra note 124 para 13.
130 Grogan op cit note 53.
131 Arguably, an employer’s right to fair labour practices may be infringed if con-
tractual damages can be claimed for unlawful termination of employment in circum-
stances where Parliament, in giving effect to s 23(1), set out to limit the employer’s
liability in terms of s 194 of the LRA.
OIL ON TROUBLED WATERS? 121
SOME ANALOGIES
It is instructive to consider how the relationship between statutory and
common law rights has been interpreted in other areas of employment-
related law. Of particular interest is Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty)
Ltd,132 where the constitutionality of a statutory remedy expressly excluding
a common-law remedy was directly challenged. At issue was s 35(1) of the
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act,133 which limited
the plaintiff to claiming statutory compensation for an injury suffered at work
and barred her from suing her employer for general delictual damages. The
Constitutional Court dismissed the challenge for the following reasons:
‘Whether an employee ought to have retained the common-law right to claim
damages, either over and above or as an alternative to the advantages conferred
by the Compensation Act, represents a highly debatable, controversial and
complex matter of policy. It involves a policy choice which the legislature and
not a court must make. The contention represents an invitation to this Court to
make a policy choice under the guise of rationality review; an invitation which
is ﬁrmly declined. The legislature clearly considered that it was appropriate to
grant to employees certain beneﬁts not available at common law. The scheme is
ﬁnanced through contributions from employers. No doubt for these reasons
the employee’s common-law right against an employer is excluded. Section
35(1) of the Compensation Act is therefore logically and rationally connected
to the legitimate purpose of the Compensation Act, namely, a comprehensive
regulation of compensation for disablement caused by occupational injuries or
diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the course of their
employment.’134
The similarity between this approach and that of the House of Lords in
Unisys is evident. The Jooste case is, of course, distinguishable from Fedlife v
Wolfaardt in that COIDA expressly excludes any common-law remedy
whereas the LRA is silent on the question. The issue, thus, is whether
Chapter VIII of the LRA (in providing statutory remedies for unfair
dismissal) by implication excludes contractual remedies. The judgment in
Jooste assists in answering this question by emphasizing the importance of
legislative purpose, a factor which the court in Fedlife considered only in
passing.
Also of importance is the scope of a statutory remedy. Even where it does
set out to replace a common-law remedy, a statutory remedy may fail to do
so. In such an event the common-law remedy will survive to the extent of
any hiatus in the statute. This was demonstrated (again in the context of
COIDA) in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck135 where
the employee of a labour broker, after being injured whilst working for the
latter’s client, sought to hold the client vicariously liable for wrongful
132 1999 (2) SA1 (CC).
133 Act 130 of 1993 (‘COIDA’).
134 Paragraph 17.
135 2007 (2) SA118 (SCA).
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conduct of its employees. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that, since the
labour broker (and not the client) was the claimant’s employer,136 s 35(1) of
COIDA did not immunize the client against common-law claims. Thus,
even though the labour broker may well have been liable in terms of
COIDA (in that the employee’s injury arose ‘out of and in the course of’ her
employment with the labour broker), and therefore no common-law claim
could lie against the labour broker, nothing prevented the employee from
seeking delictual damages from the client for which she was actually
working. This gap is particularly signiﬁcant. There can be no doubt that
COIDA set out to create a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. The Rieck case is a
reminder that COIDA, like other employment statutes, remains premised on
the ‘typical’ (full-time, indeﬁnite) employment relationship. In this respect,
as in others, the law has yet to take full cognizance of the proliferation of
‘atypical’ employment relationships that often fall beyond the ambit of
traditional deﬁnitions.
The most important analogy, however, is to be found in the sphere of
administrative law. It goes without saying (to lay a contentious issue
immediately to rest) that administrative law applies to the exercise of public
power and ﬁnds no application in the individual employment relationship.
However, the relationship between statutory and common-law remedies has
been analysed with particular clarity in the administrative sphere and the
principles thus developed are equally illuminating in the context of
employment. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re: Ex Parte
Application of President of the RSA137 the Constitutional Court, in dealing with
the validity of the exercise of executive power, explained the relationship
between the Constitution and the common law as follows:
‘There are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same subject matter,
each having similar requirements, each operating in its own ﬁeld with its own
highest Court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution
which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.’
Four years later, in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism,138 O’Regan J applied this analysis in a context where a
statute had been enacted to regulate the constitutional right in question:
‘There are not two systems of law regulating administrative action — the
common law and the Constitution — but only one system of law grounded in
136 In terms of s 198(2) of the LRA.
137 2000 (2) BCLR 674 (CC) para 44ff. It should be noted that this matter arose
before the enactment of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(‘PAJA’).
138 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 22, with reference to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa supra note 138.
See also Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd supra note 41 paras
434–7.
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the Constitution. The Courts’ power to review administrative action no longer
ﬂows directly from the common law but from PAJA and the Constitution itself.
The grundnorm of administrative law is now to be found in the ﬁrst place not
in the doctrine of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
nor in the common law itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The
common law informs the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution, and derives
its force from the latter. The extent to which the common law remains relevant
to administrative review will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis as
the courts interpret and apply the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.’
(footnotes omitted.)
Much the same can be said of employment law. There are not two systems
of law regulating the employment relationship but ‘only one system of law
grounded in the Constitution’. Its grundnorm is no longer to be found in the
contract of employment (as modiﬁed by statute); it is to be found ‘in the
principles of our Constitution’ – especially s 23, but not only there. In
regulating employment relations, too, ‘[t]he extent to which the common
law remains relevant . . . will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis as
the courts interpret and apply the provisions of . . . [the LRA, the BCEA]
and the Constitution.’139
This line of reasoning suggests an alternative to the ad hoc development of
common-law remedies alongside, and possibly at the expense of, statutory
remedies. In the next section it will be considered to what extent the basis for
such an approach can be found within labour jurisprudence itself.
RECONCILING COMMON LAW, STATUTE AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION
Fedlife v Wolfaardt is where the concurrence of statutory and common-law
remedies was ﬁrst asserted; an obvious starting point in considering an
alternative approach, therefore, is the dissenting judgment of FronemanAJA
(as he then was) in that matter. The essential steps in his reasoning may be
summarized as follows:140
• The facts of the matter ‘clearly bring the respondent within the
deﬁnition of ‘‘employee’’ in s 213 of the Act, and the termination of his
employment within the deﬁnition of ‘‘dismissal’’ in s 186.’
• ‘Dismissal upon an unlawful breach of contract by an employer is an
unfair dismissal. And the Act deals fully with the consequences of an
unfair dismissal.’
• Section 195 of the LRA141 ensures that the Act does not ‘[deprive]
employees, on dismissal, of the right to enforce bargained terms in their
139 See also Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (2) SA198 (SCA) paras 11–12.
140 See paras 8ff of the judgment.
141 Section 195 states that ‘[a]n order or award of compensation made in terms of
this Chapter is in addition to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to which the
employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employ-
ment.’ Froneman DJP, in other words, suggests that the statutory remedies may be
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contracts of employment that would put them in a better ﬁnancial
position than that which the statute itself provides for’.
• ‘Once it is accepted that this particular dispute is one about the fairness of
a dismissal it follows that it must be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure set out in s 191 of the Act.’
Reference is also made to the trenchant critique by Zondo JP, in
Langeveldt v Vryburg Transitional Local Council,142 of the overlap in jurisdiction
and causes of action between the Labour Court, the High Court and other
tribunals. Although the Supreme Court of Appeal had not yet handed down
its judgment in Fedlife v Wolfaardt at that point, Zondo JP assumed that a
claim of unlawful dismissal could go either to the High Court or Labour
Court to be decided in terms of common law whereas, if the same dismissal is
claimed to be ‘unfair’, it had to be dealt with in terms of the LRA. This state
of affairs, the learned Judge-President found, created uncertainty in that the
various courts ‘have different jurisdictions and powers in relation to virtually
the same dispute’.143 For Zondo JP the solution lay in the creation of ‘a single
hierarchy of courts [with] jurisdiction in respect of all employment and
labour matters’; and, to this end, he urged that ‘all such jurisdiction as the
High Courts may presently have in employment and labour disputes be
transferred to the Labour Court and all such jurisdiction as the Supreme
Court of Appeal may have in employment and labour disputes be transferred
to the Labour Appeal Court’.144
Ironically, it may be noted, the Superior Courts Bill of 2003145
subsequently did propose a ‘single hierarchy of courts’ (albeit in response to
another problem) but with a difference: it envisaged the merger of the
Labour Court with the High Court and of the LabourAppeal Court with the
Supreme Court of Appeal. This process, and the impact it may have on the
relationship between contractual and statutory rights in the future, must be
left to another discussion.
The issue, thus, presented itself in the labour courts primarily as a practical
problem of legal incoherence and conﬂicting jurisdictions in dealing with
labour disputes. The overarching authority of the Constitution was never
denied and has been invoked on numerous occasions, but seldom in seeking
a solution to the problem of competing sources of law. The judgment of the
Constitutional Court in Bato Star certainly had no immediate impact.
Although it was referred to in some cases, this was primarily in the context of
seeking solutions to other, more speciﬁc questions — in particular, whether
supplemented by individually bargained contractual provisions rather than a general
right to claim contractual damages in addition to statutory compensation.
142 (2001) 22 ILJ 1116 (LAC) paras 23ff.
143 Paragraph 64.
144 Paragraph 67.
145 After much debate, the Bill at the time of writing still appeared to be with the
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development of the National
Assembly: seeNational Council of Provinces Order PaperNo 19 of 7 June 2007.
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awards of the CCMA should be regarded as ‘administrative action’ subject to
review in terms of PAJA,146 and whether actions by the state in its capacity as
employer qualify as ‘administrative action’ subject to PAJA.147
In Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality,148 although no reference was made to
Bato Star, a signiﬁcant step was taken towards fashioning a solution similar to
that developed by the Constitutional Court in the administrative sphere. In
this rather complex matter, involving an urgent application to prevent a
disciplinary hearing, the applicant alleged an unfair labour practice on the
part of his employer as well as material breach of his contract of employment.
Although the application was disposed of on the basis that the court lacked
jurisdiction it, Pillay J went on in an obiter dictum to express a view on the
proper way to deal with cases where different causes of action are
intertwined. It is worth quoting the salient comments at some length:
‘The interface between the Constitution, labour legislation and the common
law depends on the right claimed and how it is pleaded. If a claim is pleaded as a
breach of contract, the courts are duty-bound to decide it on that basis subject
to these caveats: Firstly, the courts have a duty to develop the common law to
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights . . .
Secondly, a common-law breach of contract could also be a statutory
violation. A court will need to enquire whether the statute supplants the
common law. If it does, the statutory procedures and remedies must apply. . . .
Thirdly, a common-law breach of the contract of employment remains an
employment dispute. As such, sight should not be lost of the primary object[s]
of the LRA. . . .
Lastly, irrespective of whether a right is claimed under the common law or
legislation it must be consistent with the overarching authority of the
Constitution.’
Having warned against ‘the potential development of two parallel streams
of labour law, one under the common law and the other under labour
legislation, one through the general civil courts and the other through the
specialist labour courts’, Pillay J elaborated as follows:
‘Litigants will frame their cases opportunistically by weighing and contrasting
the risks and costs against the beneﬁts of High Court and Labour Court
litigation. The courts are straightjacketed into responding to disputes on the
basis of how they are pleaded and presented. Practitioners should plead and
present cases in ways that enable the courts to develop labour law as one system
of law under the Constitution. Labour and employment law under the
Constitution compels a mind shift from a linear common law approach to a
polycentric socio-economic approach. After all, labour rights fall under the
broad family of socio-economic rights. Not to treat them as such would defeat
the aims of the Constitution.’149
146 PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture (2004) 25 ILJ 1750 (LC)
147 SAPU v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (2005) 26 ILJ
2403 (LC).
148 Supra note 83.
149 Paragraphs 23–7.
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This line of reasoning has yet to be developed further in the jurisprudence
of the labour courts.150 It does, however, provide a clear basis from which to
address the continued relevance of common-law remedies, in the para-
phrased words of O’Regan J (above), ‘on a case-by-case basis as the courts
interpret and apply the provisions of [the LRA, the BCEA] and the
Constitution.’
Finally, reference has been made to the principle that, where necessary, the
common law must be ‘developed’ to give effect to the Constitution (in the
present context, particularly the right to fair labour practices) where
legislation (and established common law rules) fail to do so.151 This issue was
touched on in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA152 where an arbitrator’s award in
respect of an unfair labour practice concerning the provision of beneﬁts was
on review. ‘Beneﬁts’, ToddAJ concluded, fall into two categories: those that
are due in terms of contract and those that are at the discretion of the
employer. In the ﬁrst case, he held, there is an overlap between the
jurisdiction of the CCMA to arbitrate disputes of this nature and that of the
courts to adjudicate contractual disputes, whereas, in the second, the CCMA
will have exclusive jurisdiction (unless the contract itself requires the
employer to act fairly). Todd AJ then made the following observation:
‘It is possible that a contractual term to this effect (imposing a duty on the
employer to act fairly) will readily be implied in the context of employment
beneﬁts. The courts have, on a number of occasions, found an implied duty of
good faith. . . . It seems to me that the requirement of fairness derived from the
right to fair labour practices may well be found to coincide substantially if not
completely with the duty of good faith referred to in these decisions.’153
The last sentence evidently refers to the constitutional right to fair labour
practices rather than the speciﬁc requirements of fairness deﬁned by s 186(2)
of the LRA. If so, it reinforces the approach outlined above by providing a
concrete instance of interpreting a contract of employment in accordance
with s 23(1) of the Constitution.
It remains, in the light of what has been said, to revisit the third element of
the equation: statutory rights that give effect to constitutional rights, and
their relationship to the corresponding common-law rights.
150 The only reference thus far made to it in reported judgments was by the High
Court in Olivier v MTN Management Services (2006) 27 ILJ 547 (W) where Claasen J
dismissed an application for a similar interdict brought in terms of s 23(1) of the
Constitution on the ground that it was ‘undesirable that an unfair labour practice
should be the subject of litigation in this court prior to any decision in that regard in
the Labour Court’ (at 554D).
151 See the discussion above.
152 Supra note 38 paras 36–8.
153 Paragraph 38, with reference to Tek Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz supra
note 111 at 894B-E; IBM Pensioners Action Group v IBM SA (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ
1467 (PFA) paras 27–38.
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STATUTORY VIS--VIS CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS: A BALANCE
SHEET
It is possible to identify at least ﬁve ways in which statutory regulation of the
employment relationship may impact on common-law rights and obliga-
tions:
• There may be no impact at all, namely where a statutory provision ﬁlls a
contractual void or adds a new right without changing any pre-existing
contractual obligation. An example of this is the right of employees to be
transferred to the ‘new employer’ when a business is transferred as a
‘going concern’ in terms of s 197 of the LRA. This gives employees a
right they did not have before but, in itself, places no new obligation on
their existing employer.
• Statutory provisions may expressly or implicitly override contractual
rights and obligations. One example, discussed above, is s 35(1) of
COIDA, which expressly removes an employee’s common-law right to
claim damages from an employer for an accident suffered at work.
Another is s 186(1)(b) of the LRA,154 which overrides the common-law
rule that a ﬁxed-term contract expires automatically and without
termination by either party. Indeed, s 186(1)(b) may apply ‘even though
the written contract of employment expressly stipulates that the
employee fully understands that he has no expectation of the contract
being renewed’.155 Similarly, ss 200A of the LRA and 83A of the BCEA
create a presumption that, in given circumstances, a person working for
another is an ‘employee’ for statutory purposes ‘regardless of the form of
the contract’ between them.
• Statutory provisions may be contingent on the existence of a contract of
employment or the exercise of a contractual right. For example, in terms
of s 197 of the LRA the rights vested in employees (as mentioned above)
are premised on the existence of contracts of employment between the
old employer and affected employees ‘immediately before the date of the
transfer’ . Another example, (also discussed in some detail above) is the
LRA’s reliance on ‘termination’ of a contract of employment by an
employer to trigger the statutory rules applicable to ‘dismissal’.156
• Statutory provisions giving effect to the basic right to fair labour practices
may coexist with equitable common-law doctrines, such as the mutual
duties of good faith, trust and conﬁdence, without any competition
between them and, hence, no implication of abolishing those doc-
154 Providing that ‘dismissal’ includes an employer’s failure to renew an employee’s
ﬁxed-term contract in a situation where the employee ‘reasonably expected’ this to
happen.
155 SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 1041 (LC) para 13; Mediterranean
Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union (1998) 19 ILJ 731 (SCA) at
733–4.
156 See s 186 and the discussion above.
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trines.157 If anything, it is submitted, the contrary is to be inferred, since
those doctrines are the very foundations on which the development of
common law beyond the limits of the statutory provisions may depend.
• Finally, statutory provisions may create new rights and obligations which
do compete with existing contractual or common-law rights (that is,
arise under the same circumstances as) but do not expressly repeal them –
a grey area which has been the primary focus of this article. Among the
examples discussed above is s 186(1)(e) of the LRA,158 which practically
codiﬁes the common-law rule relating to repudiation of a contract of
employment by an employer159 but is silent as to its impact on that rule.
More generally, the law of unfair dismissal at various points covers the
same ground as the common law governing the termination of
employment, raising numerous uncertainties which ultimately come
down to a single question: is the purpose of the statutory regime merely
to supplement the common-law regime, or to supersede the latter in
accordance with broader constitutional objectives?
In approaching these questions the courts have tended to proceed
cautiously, laying down few principles capable of general application and
showing little inclination to extend those principles beyond the circum-
stances in which they were formulated. Thus, while breach of contract is
now recognized as a cause of action in the alternative to a statutory claim of
unfair dismissal in the case of ﬁxed-term employees, there has been no
comparable afﬁrmation of claims for breach of contract as an alternative to
unfair labour practice claims where conduct amounting to breach of contract
is alleged.160 There are, however, indications that such claims would be
157 Similarly, at a procedural level, the status quo remedy created by s 64(4) of LRA
enables an employee or trade union temporarily to restrain an employer from unilat-
erally varying terms and conditions of employment. This cannot be understood as
implying that such unilateral variation is permissible subject to s 64(4); rather, the
purpose is to create an additional mechanism designed to avert the costlier remedies
of breach of contract claims or industrial action, but not excluding these. See SAPU v
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (2006) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC) paras
79 and 81.
158 See note 108 above and discussion in the text thereto.
159 Thus, ‘[u]nilateral demotion is a form of repudiation of the contract of employ-
ment, amounting to a constructive dismissal’: Mhlambi v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 814
(LC) para 15. See also Jooste v Transnet Ltd (1995) 16 ILJ 629 (LAC) at 639; WL Ochse
Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen supra note 4 at 128; Pretoria Society for the Care of
the Retarded v Loots (1997) 18 ILJ 981 (LAC); Victoria Hospital Ltd v CCMA [2001] 10
BLLR 1185 (LC) para 14; Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd [2003] 12 BLLR 1274 (LC)
para 26.
160 In WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen supra note 4, decided in
terms of the 1956 LRA, the previous LAC held that an unfair labour practice claim
(in casu based on dismissal) precluded a breach of contract claim. But cf Unilong Freight
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Muller (1998) 19 ILJ 229 (SCA) at 239C (also decided under the
1956Act) where Vivier JAdistinguished between remedies for breach of contract and
those for the ‘the broader concept of an unfair labour practice’.
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entertained.161 It is pertinent to note that compensation is capped only in
respect of dismissal and unfair labour practice claims, thus removing any
ﬁnancial incentive for claimants to pursue common-law remedies in respect
of other disputes.162 But is the quantum of compensation, as opposed to the
existence of a remedy, a good enough reason to justify the development of
legal doctrine?
It is submitted that a broader view is needed. Hepple, dealing with the
same issues in the context of UK law, spoke of ‘the ‘‘great structural
problem’’163 of the unsatisfactory relationship between common law and
statutory rights’.164 ‘The common law of employment and statutory rights’
he argued, ‘are imbricated, like overhanging roof-tiles, and keep each other
in place. Their separation in Johnson v Unisys165 and other cases means there is
a leaky roof.’166 In South Africa the approach in Johnson [v Unisys] has been
rejected. If any principle can be read into the decisions discussed above, it is
the importance attached by the courts to upholding or developing
common-law rights in the interests of employee protection. To that extent,
the roof will not leak. But, as we have also seen, the ‘imbrication’ of statute
and common law is not always neat, and various parts of the law have taken
on a ‘patchwork’ appearance as a result of questionable legislative drafting
and/or ad hoc jurisprudence. To that extent, some employees seeking shelter
in the house of legal protection (Ms Morgan) may still be exposed to the
elements but others (Mr Wolfaardt) not. This is likely to remain the case for
as long as the relationship between statute and the common law of
employment is not addressed systematically.
But there is yet another difference. The existence of a Bill of Rights in
South Africa introduces, as it were, a blueprint for the way in which the
common law of employment and statutory rights should supplement one
another. Both must be interpreted in such a way as to give comprehensive
161 See United National Public Servants Association of SA v Digomo NO (2005) 26 ILJ
1957 (SCA) where it is observed that ‘[t]he remedies that the Labour Relations Act
provides against conduct that constitutes an ‘‘unfair labour practice’’ are not exhaus-
tive of the remedies that might be available to employees in the course of the employ-
ment relationship’ and that ‘[p]articular conduct by an employer might constitute
both an ‘‘unfair labour practice’’ (against which the Act provides a speciﬁc remedy)
and it also might give rise to other rights of action’ (para 4). Cf the similar observation
by Landman J in Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 188 (LC)
para 20, and see Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality supra note 83 para 21ff.
162 Section 194 LRA.
163 Per Lord Steyn in Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc supra note 124 para 51.
164 Hepple op cit note 48 at 2.
165 Johnson v Unisys supra note 120.
166 Hepple op cit note 48 at 20.An important ‘leak’, in the case of theUK, is the fact
that the rule in Johnson v Unisys precludes a common-law right of action only where a
statutory remedy exists (e g, in the event of dismissal) but leaves it intact where no
such right of action exists (e g, in the event of suspension).As a result, employers must
dismiss rather than suspend employees to avoid the risk of claims for uncapped dam-
ages.
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effect, between them, to the right to ‘fair labour practices’ as promised by
s 23(1) of the Constitution and international law. The fact that contractual
rights may need to be ‘developed’167 to fulﬁl this purpose underscores the
inherently dynamic nature of labour law and the interaction between
common law and statute. Contractual rights operate alongside statutory
rights as instruments for achieving the objects of the LRA. The principles
outlined in Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality168 provide a jurisprudential basis
for such an approach.
How should the matter be taken forward? Hepple, writing from a British
perspective, proposes that individual employment rights should be codiﬁed
within a comprehensive legislative framework ‘which promotes collective
bargaining and is freed from the contract of service’.169 Such a framework
‘would leave a role for contract law only to improve on the minimum
standards prescribed by the code or by collective bargaining’.170 At the same
time the author acknowledges that such a code would face deep-rooted
opposition and is unlikely to see the light of day in the foreseeable future.
South Africa’s Bill of Rights already provides a legally binding framework
for the elaboration of employment rights.171 The problem is that the
framework is very general, setting parameters rather than deﬁning rights, and
ﬂexible enough to accommodate (or at least not prevent) the inconsistencies
which have been noted. To that extent the challenge existing in the UK faces
South African labour law as well. Inconsistencies will be eliminated to the
extent that the right to fair labour practices at the individual level is codiﬁed
and scope for contractual variation is conﬁned to areas and issues where the
legislature considers it appropriate.
The BCEA already does this in respect of terms and conditions of
employment relating to working time, leave and certain other matters. Its
modus operandi is instructive. First, it lays down ‘basic’ or minimum
conditions in these areas which may be ‘revised upward’ in the manner
suggested by Hepple. Second, it permits ‘revision downward’ of basic
conditions in respect of deﬁned issues by bargaining council agreement,172
collective agreement outside a bargaining council,173 or by written agree-
ment174 or verbal agreement175 between employer and employee. In
167 Section 8(3) of the Constitution.
168 Supra note 83.
169 Hepple op cit note 48 at 24.
170 Ibid at 25.
171 European law, and its Directives applicable to employment, fulﬁll this role in the
UK only to a limited extent.
172 See s 49(1) BCEA.
173 For example, to ‘average’ hours of work for periods up to four months: see s 12
read with s 49(2) BCEA.
174 For example, to ‘compress’ working hours for periods of up to one week: see
s 11 BCEA.
175 For example, to reduce the prescribed lunch break of one hour to not less than
30minutes: see s 14(5) BCEA.
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general, the more fundamental a provision is to an employee’s dignity and
quality of life, the more strictly it is guarded and the narrower the possibilities
of varying it downward. The power imbalance between employer and
employee is central to this calculation. Thus, variations that may impact on
employees’ quality of life to a signiﬁcant extent are possible only by collective
agreement; the assumption is clearly that trade unions have the power to
resist employer pressure and will protect their members’ interests. Con-
versely, relatively minor variations are permitted by individual agreement.
Bargaining councils, as statutory bodies bound to give effect to the purposes
of legislation, are given the most extensive powers of all — in effect to design
minimum regulatory conditions for their sectors as an alternative to the
scheme of the BCEA. But even bargaining councils are expressly prohibited
from reducing certain fundamental conditions176 and are bound to observe
constitutional rights and values not expressly regulated by the Act.
What are the prospects of systematically extending a framework of this
nature to include all individual employment rights, including those regulated
by the LRA and, in particular, the rules governing unfair dismissal and unfair
labour practices? In fact, following the promulgation of the interim
Constitution, it had been envisaged that a statute comprehensively regulat-
ing individual employment relations would be enacted and, with this in
mind, the ‘mixed bag of unfair labour practices gleaned from the
jurisprudence [of the Industrial Court]’ was included in the LRA ‘only as a
holding operation’.177 Yet this plan has remained shelved for a decade.178
The preoccupation of business, labour and government with the alleged
over-regulation of the labour market, the perceived burdens imposed on
small employers and, in particular, the much-contested extension of
bargaining council agreements to non-party employers, may partly explain
the lack of focus on the regulation of the individual employment
relationship. This, however, should not be the end of the matter. The
original challenge remains: either to enact a comprehensive employment
code in the form of a consolidated statute or to amend the relevant
provisions, wherever they are located, in such a way as to establish a ﬂoor of
statutory rights with contractual variation possible only where expressly
permitted and to the speciﬁed extent.
The obstacles to such an exercise may be political rather than legal. Either
option would require a generally acceptable design for harmonizing the
rights and duties currently regulated by the BCEA, the LRA and the EEA as
well as common law. Given the requirements of the National Economic
176 For example, the prohibition of working time in excess of 45 ordinary hours or
the reduction of annual leave to less than twoweeks per year: see s 49(1).
177 Halton Cheadle ‘Regulated ﬂexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’
(2006) 27 ILJ 663 para 26–7.
178 Indeed, the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 2002 moved the ‘mixed bag
of unfair labour practices’ from the schedule where they had been placed, adding
them to the body of theAct.
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Development and Labour Council Act,179 it would involve negotiation
between government, business and labour about the substance of rights
which are currently left to the discretion of the courts. Such a process,
judging by past experience, is likely to be complicated. The drafting of the
LRA and BCEA, as well as the substantive amendments of both statutes in
2002, were highly contentious; and enough unﬁnished business remains
between capital and labour to suggest that a fundamental re-examination of
the employment relationship would be no less contentious. One reason for
postponing it might well be to avoid opening cans of worms on which the
lids have thus far been kept. Or is it perhaps now the time, fourteen years
into democracy, to lift them?
The advantage of codiﬁcation over case law is akin to the advantage of
foresight over astonishment: in general, it allows for greater adherence to
policy and greater predictability. If employment law were to be codiﬁed, the
contract of employment would continue to play its part in giving effect to
constitutional values within a more clearly circumscribed domain. The great
difference would be that contractual terms could deviate from statutory
rights only where this was expressly permitted. Never again would a court
have to rule on policy issues as it was called on to do in Fedlife v Wolfaardt.
179 35 of 1994.
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